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V I R G I N I A 
IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE COUNTY OF HANOVER 
STEWART A. GOODWIN, 
v. 
DAVID KEITH HARE 
5414 Camille Drive 
Mechanicsville, VA 23111, _ 
MOTION FOR JUDGMENT 
Plaintiff, 
Defendant. 
Comes now the plaintiff, Stewart A. Goodwin, by counsel, and 
moves this Honorable Court for judgment against the defendant, 
David Keith Hare, in the sum of Twenty-Five Thousand Dollars 
( $25, 000. 00) representing compensatory damages and Fifty Thousand 
Dollars ($50,000.00) representing punitive damages, for the 
following reasons, to wit: 
1. That your plaintiff, Stewart A. Goodwin, in the course 
·-
of her duties as a Hanover County Deputy Sheriff, on October 6, 
1990, responded to a complaint at a residence in the County of 
Hanover, at 702 Robin Road, Hanover, VA 23069. 
2. That during the investigation of the complaint, the 
plaintiff attempted to arrest the defendant. 
3. The defendant resisted the arrest and did illegally 
assault and batter the plaintiff. 
4. That the defendant was charged with assault of the 
plaintiff and plead guilty to the charge in this Court on January 
28, 1991. 
5. That the conduct of the defendant in assaulting the 
plaintiff was willful and intentional and designed with the 
intent to do harm to plaintiff. 
6. That by reason of and as a direct and proximate result 
of the defendant's wilful and intentional conduct, the plaintiff 
has suffered permanent physical injury, has incurred medical 
I expenses, has suffered loss of income and loss of ability to work 
ii 11 
i in the future, has suffered great physical pain and anguish, and 
has suffered other damages. 
I 
I 
That by reason of and as a direct and proximate result 7. 
of the defendant's conduct, the plaintiff has sustained damages 
I compensatory 
! 
amount of Twenty-Five Thousand in the damages 
1. 
Dollars ($25,000.00). 
WHEREFORE, the plaintiff prays that she be granted a 
judgment against the defendant for the damages she has suffered 
including great physical pain and suffering, permanent physical 
injury, medical expenses, loss of income, loss of ability to work 
in the future, physical pain and mental anguish suffered in the 
past and reasonably expected to suffer in the future, inconven-
!j ience caused in the past and the inconvenience reasonably 
!, i! expected in the future, and the plaintiff prays for a judgment in 
the amount of Twenty-Five Thousand Dollars ($25,000.00) 
representing compensatory damage for the negligence aforesaid, 
and judgment in the amount of Fifty Thousand Dollars ($50,000.00) 
representing punitive damages for the wilful, intentional and 
deliberate assault of the plaintiff. 
A trial by jury is demanded. 
STEWART A. GOODWIN 
By: 
Edward D. Barnes 
Englisby, Barne~, Hennes~~ & Englisby 
P. O. Box 85 
10101 Ironbridge Road 





V I R G I N I A: 




DAVID KEITH .HARE, 
Defendant. 
GROUNDS OF DEFENSE 
Comes now the defe ndant, David Ke ith Hare , by counsel, and his 
Grounds of Defense to the plaintiff's Motion for Judgment, states the 
following: 
1.) The defendant admits Paragraph #1. 
2.) The defendant d e nies Paragraph #2, as the plaintiff neve r 
attempted nor identified that the defendant was under arrest or being 
placed under arrest. 
3 .) The defendant denies the Paragraph . #3 and calls for strict 
proof thereof. 
4.) The defendant admits Paragraph #4 , but was under the advice 
of counsel, pursuant to a plea agreement. 
5. ) The defendant denies Paragraph's #5, #6 and #7 and calls for 
strict proof thereof . 
6. ) The defendant also denies any punitive damages are due and 
owing as alleged in £he plaintiff's WHEREFORE c lause. 
7.) The defendant states as an affirmative defense that an accord 
and satisfaction agreement has been r eaGhed between the parties and 




WHEREFORE, the defendant prays that this case me dismissed 
agreed because an accord and satisfaction agreement has been reached 
and further that he be awarded attorney's fees for the defense or this 
suit. 
Carl J. Witmeyer, II 
CHALKLEY & WITMEYER 
Post Off ice Box 6006 
Ashland, Virginia 23005 
(804) 550-2106 
I hereby certify 
Defense was on this 
Esquire, 10101 Iron 
Chesterfield~ Virginia 
5 
David Keith Hare 
CERTIFICATE 
that a 





copy of the foregoing Grounds of 
of June, 1991 to Edward Barnes, 
Chesterfield Courthouse Square, 
. . 
V I R G I N I A : 
~ 
IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE COUNTY OF HANOVER 
STEWART A. GOODWIN, 
Plaintiff, 
v CASE NO .: CL91-177 
DAVID KEITH HARE, 
Defendant. 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Comes now David Keith Hare, by counsel, and for its Motion for 
Summary Judgment, states as follows: 
1. Plaintff's personal injuries result from making a lawful 
arrest. 
2. Plaintiff was on duty as a Deputy Sherif f for Hanover 
County, and was responding to a complaint of loud music. 
3. Plaintiff's c laim is barred by the "Fireman's Rule'' as 
detailed in the attached Memorandum of Law. 
WHEREFORE, David . Keith Hare, by counsel, move s for summary 
judgment against the plaintiff herein, and for its costs expended. 
MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
The plaintiff was responding to a compaint as part of her duties 
as a Deputy Sheriff for Hanover County, when she engaged in making a 
lawful arrest. Plaintiff alleges that David Keith Hare resisted 
arrest, forcing the plaintiff to take evasive action, which resulted 
in plaintiff's personal injuries. 
Virginia law adheres to the · "Fireman's Rule," which holds that a 
6 
police officer cannot ·recover from a negligent or intentional party 
for injuries sustained by the police officer while performing her job 
duties. Accordingly, plaintiff cannot recover for her injuries from 
the alleged negligent or intentional party tort feasor - Worker's 
Compensation benefits are her sole remedy. 
The Virginia Supreme Court first recognized the ''Fireman ' s Rule" 
in Chesapeake & Ohio Railway Company V Crouch, 208 Va. 602, 159 
S.E. 2d 650 (1968). In that case, a forest fire was negligently 
stated, and a fireman died while trying to fight the fire. The Court 
reasoned that the fireman assumed the risk of the dangers inherent in 
fighting a forest fire, and therefore could not recover in a tort 
action. The Supreme Court expressly extended this doctrine to police 
officers in Pearson V Canada Contracting Co., 232 Va. 177 (1968). 
The "Fireman's Rule" exists because fireman and policeman cannot 
be classified as trespassers, licensees or invitees, but rather exist 
in a class o~· their own because of the public nature of their - rights 
and duties. Crouch, 208 Va . at 608, 159 S.E . 2d at 6~5; Pearson, 232 
Va. at 183. The Virginia Supreme Court expressly noted that: 
Injuries to fireman and policeman are compensable through 
workers' compensation. Code Section 65.1-4,-4.1. The 
burden of their financial loss, therefore, is properly 
borne by the public rather than by [individuals]. 
Person, 232 Va . at 184. 
The crux of the "Fireman's Rule" is that the police officer 
assumes the usual risks inherently involved in her duties. In the 
case at bar, the plaintiff assumed the usual risks ·inherently 
involved in making an arrest. One of those risks is clearly the 
officer's losing control of the arres·tee. · In discussing the public 
policy behind the "Fireman's Rule," the Virginia Supreme Court has 
stated: 
policeman, fireman, and other public officers are often 
called upon, in the performance of their ordinary duties, 
to undertake great personal risks for the protection of 
the persons and property of ,others. They frequently 
respond to these demands with great personal courage. 
Neverthelessi it has not been the policy of the law of 
Virginia to facilitate litigation by such public officers 
as a means of compensating them for injuries received in 
the line - of duty, but rather.to impose that burden on the 
public generally, through workers' compensation and other 
benefits. Pearson V Canada Contracting Co. 232 Va. 177 , 
184-5, 349 S. E. 2d 106, 111 (1968). In applying that 
policy, we perceive no logical basis for a distinction 
between damage to public property and injuries to public 
officers. 
In Pearson, we equated policeman with fireman as 
officers in a class of their own because of the public 
nature of their rights and duties. Under the "Fireman's 
Rule", such officers are held, as a matter of law, to 
assume the risks of injury occasioned by ordinary 
negligence inherently involved in the normal pursuit of 
their duties. Citations omitted. The rationale of the 
"Fireman's Rule" does not apply the assumption of risk 
doctrine to public officers because of any spirit of 
venturesomeness in the face of a known danger. Rather, 
it is based upon the officer's relationship with the 
public, _from which arises his obligation to accept the 
usual risks inherent in his duties, whether caused by 
negligence or not. Citation omitted. 
Commonwealth V Millsaps, 232 Va. 502, 509-510 (1987). 
While neither the Virginia Supreme Court nor the Court of 
Appeals have been presented with a police officer injured during an 
arrest, the Hampton Circuit Court has ruled as follow: 
The Court finds that Richard E. Bouce, Jr., was employed 
as a state trooper and was on duty when the incidents on 
which the Motion for Judgment is based occurred . The 
Court finds that .as a state trooper Richard E. Boyce, Jr., 
assumed the risk of injuries occasioned by ordinary 
negligence inherently involved in the normal pursuit of 
his duties. The Court finds that Richard E. Boyce 
sustained injury following a high speed chase in pursuit 
of Defendant John Doe and that such an activity is within 
the normal duties of a state trooper. 
Boyce V Cooper, Law No. L-22250 (Hampton Cir. 1989). 
8 
There are not material facts in dispute, The plaintiff was 
injured while engaged in making a lawful arrest of the defendant. She 
was injured as the result of making a lawful arrest which occurred as 
a result of a complaint. Under the case law cited above, the 
"Fireman's Rule'' ~learly applies to this case, and therefore the 
plaintiff cannot obtain a judgment against the allegedly negligent or 
intentional party. As referenced.in several of the cases, the 
plaintiff's sole remedy is to receive her workers' compensation 
benefits. 
Accordingly, David Keith Hare asks that this Court dismiss the 
lawsuit filed by the plaintiff with prejudice. 
DAVID KEITH HARE 
Carl J. Witmeyer,II 
CHALKLEY & WITMEYER 
327 South Richardson Road 
Post Office Box 6006 





I hereby certify that I mailed a copy of the foregoing Motion 
for Summary Judgment to Edward D. Barnes, Esquire, ENGLISBY, BARNES, 
HENNESSY & ENGLISBY, Chesterfield Courthouse Square, 10101 Iron 
Bridge Road, Chesterfield, Virginia 23832 this ~ C> day of July, 
1992. 
V I R G I N I A: 
IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE COUNTY OF HANOVER 
STEWART A. GOODWIN, Plainti.ff, 
v. CASE NO. CL91-177 r 
DAVID KEITH HARE, Defendant. 
MEMORANDUM OF LAW 
Comes now the plaintiff, Stewart A. Goodwin, by counsel, and 
states as and -for her Memorandum of Law in support of her Motion 
to Dismiss the defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, the 
following: 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On October 6, 1990, the. plaintiff, Stewart A • .-Goodwin, 
Deputy Sheriff of Hanover County, attempted to and did make an 
arrest of the defendant, David Keith Hare, at 702 Robin Road, 
Hanover, Virginia. 
defendant became 
In the process of making a lawful arrest, the 
violent, resisted arrest, and "illegally 
assaulted and battered the plaintiff. As a result, the plaintiff 
received injuries. 
The defendant was subsequently charged with assault and 
battery of the plaintiff, . and the defendant pleaded guil~y to 
this charge on January 28, 1991. The court found him guilty. 
The plaintiff filed a Motion for Judgment in this Court 
·seeking compensatory and punitive damages for the injuries that 




The defendant, by c .. ounsel, filed a Grounds of Defense to the· 
Motion for Judgment on June 28, 1991. Significantly, the 
defendant did not allege assumption of the risk as an affirmative 
defense to this action. .... ' ·· 
On July 10, 1992, the defendant, by counsel, filed a ' Motion. 
for Sunnnary Judgment and Memorandum of Law ·in support of Motion 
for Summary Judgment. In defendant's Memorandum of Law, the 
defendant relied on the "fireman's rule," which stands for the 
principle that a fireman cannot 1 recover from the ordinary 
negligence of another party because the fireman assumes the risk 
of the dangers inherent in fighting a fire. 
ISSUES 
I. Whether the "fireman's rule" applies in intentional tort 
cases? 
The "firem.in' s rule" has been developed from· the assumption 
of the risk theory. In Virginia, the "fireman's rule" has never 
been applied in an intentional tort case . It has never been 
applied even in a willful and wanton negligence case~ The 
Supreme Court of Virginia has only applied the "fireman's rule" 
in cases involving ordinary negligence. See ~' C&O Railroad 
v. Crouch, 208 Va . 602, 159 S.E.2d 650, cert. denied, 393 U.S. 
845 ( 1968) (Fireman-Plaintiff); Pearson v. Canada Contracting 
Co., 232 Va . 177, 349 S.E.2d 106 (1986) (Policeman-Plaintiff). 
The Supreme Court has further indicated that, when the 
defendant's conduct is found to be · willful and wanton, the 
defense of assumption of the risk may be entirely barred. 
Commonwealth v. Millsaps, 232 Va. 502 (1987) (citing Korzun v. 
Shahan, 151 w.va. 243, 252, 151 S.E.2d 287, 293 (1966). 
In the case at bar, the conduct of the defendant goes beyond 
willful and wanton negligence. In fact, this ·case ~as nothing to 
do with negligence. As the plaintiff pleaded, ·this is 'strictly 
a case of an intentional tort. .In an intentional tort case, the 
·-. 
defense of assumption of the risk is entirely barred. 
Further, in the case of Griffin v. Shively, 227 .Va. 317, 
322, 315 S.E.2d 210, 213 {1984), the Court stated the general 
rule that a defendant who · is guilty of willful and wanton 
negligence cannot rely upon contributory negligence as a defense. 
Similarly, a defendant who is guilty of assault and . battery 
cannot rely upon assumption of the risk as a defense. 
In addition, the court in Millsaps held the following: 
• When it is contended that a defendant's negligence 
.~ubjects the officer to an undue risk, not inherently 
involved in the normal pursuit of his duties, the issue 
ot the officer's assumption of the risk becomes one of 
fact for the jury rather than a matter of law. 
Commonwealth ·v. Millsaps, 232 Va. at 510. Thus, even .if the 
"fireman's rule" applied in intentional tort cases, the question 
of assumption of the risk must be decided by the jury and not 
summarily by the court. 
Moreover, other jurisdictions have held that the doctrine of 
assumption of the risk should not applY. to police officers in 
their normal pursuit of their duties because police officers are 
not confronted with a voluntary choice of courses of action, but 
act under the compulsion of duties imposed by law. - McAllister v. · 




Clayborne v. Mueller, 13 Md. App. 530, 284 A.2d 24 (1971) ,· 
... 
aff'd . , 291 A.2d 443 {1972) . 
Further, the rationale that injuries to firemen· and 
policemen are compensable through workmen's compensation and that 
their financial loss should be primarily borne by the public 
rather than by individuals does .not make sense .in an intentional 
tort case. The public should not have to bear the financial loss 
when an individual intentionally does harm to another. The 
rationale of placing the financial burden on the public when a 
fireman is injured fighting a fire is logical as the mass 
majority of fires are started by negligence or natural · causes •. 
Also, the outbreak of a fire is much more of a public concern. 
The rationale also makes sense when a police officer is injured 
in an automobile accident due to driver error or negligence' while 
in pursuit of a traffic violator. (Although the Virginia Supreme 
court has indicated that it would follow Korzun v. Shahan, 151 
w. va. 243, 151 S.E . 2d 287 (1966), in holding that when the 
traffic violator's conduct is found to be willful and wanton, the 
defense of assumption of the risk may be entirely barred.) 
Clearly, the rationale would not make sense when a driver 
intentionally crashes his vehicle into a police officer's vehicle 
in order to cause death or bodily injury. 
The defendant, in his Motion and Memorandum in support of 
Summary Judgment, has not cited a case that is applicable to the 
case at bar. All the cases cited have to do with ordinary 
negligence involving accidents on ·property or auto ·accidents. In 
C&O Railroad v. Crouch, 208 Va. 602, 159 S.E.2d 650 {1968), the 
Court held that a fireman could not recover in a tort action when~ 
injured while fighting a forest fire which was negligently 
started. The Court held that the assumption of the risk would be 
applied in cases of ordinary negligence and ~here there were no 
undue risks of injury, such as hidden, unknown and increased 
dangers, the hazard of which . a fireman 'does not ordinarily 
.... 
assume. At page 609 of Crouch, the Court stated the · following: 
There are no circumstances here to suggest that any 
negligent act of the defendant calls the deceased to be 
subjected to risk of injury beyond those inherently 
involved in fire fighting. we are not warranted, 
therefore, in applying to the situation at hand the 
undue risk exception to the general rule of non-
liabili ty. since none but the usual hazards were 
involved in fighting the fire in question, we hold, as 
a matter of law, that the deceased assumed the risk 
thereof. 
Thus, the Supreme Court recognized that the "'fireman's rule" 
would not apply in cases wher·e the plaintiff was subjected to I ,. 
·I risks __ of injury beyond those inherently involved in fire 
fighting. The same should apply with respect to police officers. 
A police officer should not be held to have assumed the risk of 
an individual intentionally assaulting and battering the police 
officer. 
In Pearson v. Canada Contracting Co., 232 Va. 177 (1968), a 
fireman and a police officer (in separate cases} were injured 
while on properties performing their duties in their respective 
positions. The Court considered the traditional categories 
· regarding indi~iduals who are injured after having entered on the 
land of others -- trespassers, licensees or invitees. The Court 
held that firemen are in a class of their own because of the 









circumstances in the· course of their duties, enter property ·as· 
licensees or invitees. The Court further held that the 
defendants were not liable for their ordinary negligence because, · 
unlike licensees and invitees, policemen and fire fighters, enter 
at unforeseeable times and go upon unusual parts of the premises, 
and their presence cannot be reasonably anticipated • . Thus, the 
level of care that is owed is not that of invitees or licensees. 
The Court specifically limited its holding to cases .involving 
injuries occurring as a result of conditions on areas of the 
premises not open to the public . Again, the facts in Pearson are 
not applicable to the case at hand. 
As the Pearson decision indicates, the rule of non-liability 
· for firemen and policemen is quite limited, as the Court held 
I, that an owner who knows or has reason to know of a dangerous 




or warn of the unsafe condition. If the owner fails to do so, 
I assumption of the risk will not be available . as a defense. In 
I Pearson, the Court held that there was no liability only because 
I 
• J it was a case of ordinary negligence and because it was not I 1 !I proven that the owners knew or should have known that firemen and 
i I policemen were on their premises. 
The Pearson Court further stated that: 
an owner or occupier may be liable to a firemen or 
policemen injured as a result of a violation o! a 
statutory duty created for the express benefit o! such 
persons. Pearson, at 232 Va. 185. 
In the present case, the defendant has a statutory duty to 
refrain from assaulting the plaintiff and to not resist arrest. 
18.2-57.1 of the Code of Virginia provides in pertinent part that 
it is a crime to commit an assault and battery against a law-
enforcement officer in the performance of his public duties, and 
such is punishable as a Class 1 misdemeanor. 
As discussed above, in the case of Commonwealth v. Millsaps, 
232 Va. 502 (1987), the Court held that the Commonwealth could 
not recover for damages to its .property caused by the ordinary 
negligence of a speeding motorist. The Court held that, since 
the Commonwealth had not alleged that the defendant was guilty of 
willful and wanton negligence, then the defense of assumption of 
risk would apply in an ordinary negligence case. Had the 
Commonwealth alleged willful and wanton negligence, the defense 
of assumption of risk would have been barred. 
Finally, the Circuit Court case of Boyce v. Cooper, Law No. 
L-22250 (Hampton cir. 1989) involved injury to a state trooper 
due to ordinary negligence involved in a high-speed chase. 
Again, the Boyce decision has no applicability to the facts of 
this case. 
II. Whether the defendant is barred from requesting relief based 
on the "fireman's rule" when the defendant has not pled 
assumption of the risk as an affirmative defense to this action? 
The defendant is requesting the Court to summarily rule on 
the facts of this case based on the "fireman's rule" which is an 
assumption of the risk theory. The defendant, however, has not 
pled assumption of the risk as an affirmative defense. The law 
in Virginia is well-settled that a party cannot rise above its 
pleadings. Massie v. Firmstone., 134 Va. 450, -114 S.E.- 652 





been put in issue by the pleadings. The defendant is barred from· 
... 
relying on that theory in requesting summary judgment. 
CONCLUSION 
The plaintiff respectfully requests this court .. to deny .the 
defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment on the basis that the 
"fireman's rule" does not apply ·to the facts of this case and on 
the basis that the defendant has not pled assumption of the risk 
as an affirmative defense to this cause of action. 
Respectfully Submitted, 
STEWART A. GOODWIN 
I ~411t_~fo 
I 'counsel Edward D. Barnes (VSB #12288) · I Daniel M. Koliadko, Jr. (VSB #30033) 
1 Edward D. Barnes & Associates, P.C. 
1 P. o . Box 104 
II 10101 Iron Bridge Road ;I Chesterfield, VA 23832 Ii c 804 > 748-5897 
,. 
1 









I certify that on this /~ day of August, 1992, I mailed 
the foregoing Memorandum of Law to Carl J . Witmeyer, II, Esq., 
Chalkley & Witmeyer, 327 South Richardson Road, P. o. Box 6006, 
Ashland, VA 23005-6006. 
v I R G r N r A : 
IN THE CIRCUI T COURT OF THE COUNTY OF HANOVER 

















MEMORANDUM OF LAW 
IN SUPPORT OF 
DEFENDANT ' S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
TO THE HONORABLE JUDGE TAYLOR OF THE AFORESAID COURT : 
Comes now the defendant; David Keith Hare ("Hare" ) , by 
counsel, and in support of his Memorandum of Law in Support of 
Defendant ' s Motion For Summary J udgment and in opposi ti.on to 
Plaintiff ' s Motion to Dismiss Defendant's Motion for Summary 
Judgmen t , respectfully states as follows: 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On October 6 , 1990 , the plaintiff, Stewart A. Goodwin 
( "Goodwin " ) responded to a complaint , as part of her duties as a 
Deputy Sheriff for the County of Hanover, when she engaged in 
making a lawful arrest of Hare . Goochdn alleges that Hare resisted 
the arrest, forcing her to take evasive action, which resulted in 
her personal injuries. 
Hare was subsequently charged with assault and battery of 
Hare; Hare plead guilty to this charge on January 28, 1991. 
1 
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Goodwin, individually, filed a Motion for Judgment in this 
court seeking damages for the injuries that she sustained while 
making a lawful arrest of Hare. Virginia law adheres to the 
"Fireman's Rule'', which holds that a police officer cannot recover 
from a negligent or intentional party for injuries sustained where 
that acts ·of the party or occurrences that caused the injury are 
those which are foreseeable in the line of the police officer's 
duties; the remedy for the police officer (or the fireman) for such 
injuries lie solely with the Virginia Worker's Compensation 
Commission. 
ISSUES 
I . WHETHER THE "FIREMAN 1 S RULE" APPLIES TO CASES 
INVOLVING AN INJURY TO A POLICE OFFICER DURING 
A LAWFUL ARREST OF A PERSON AND THAT PERSON IS 
_SUBSEQUENTLY CHARGED WITH ASSAULT AND BATTERY 
AS A RESULT OF THE INJURY? 
The Virginia Supreme Court first recognized the "Fireman's 
Rule" in Chesapeake & Ohio Railway Company v. Crouch, 208 Va. 602, 
159 S.E. 2d 650 (1968), where a fireman died while attempting to 
fight a forest fire that was started due to a person's negligence. 
The fireman's estate tried to recover in a tort action against the 
negligent fire starter but the Virginia Supreme Court denied 
liability in tort reasoning that the fireman assumed the risk of 
the dangers inherently involved in fighting fires. 
The "Fireman's Rule" has also been applied by analogy to 
police officers in Virginia, first in Pearson v. Canada Contracting 
2 
1· 9 
Co., 349 S.E. 2d 106, 232 Va. 177 (1986), and second, in 
Commonwealth v. Millsaps, 352 S.E. 2d 311, 232 Va. 502 (1987), 
where the Virginia Supreme Court, applying their reasoning in 
Pearson, stated: 
In Pearson, we equated policemen with firemen as 
officers in a class of their own because of the public 
nature· of their rights and~uties. Under the "fireman's 
rule," such officers are · held, as a matter of law, to 
assume the risks of injury occasioned by ordinary 
negligence inherently involved in the normal pursuit of 
. their [the police officer's] duties .... The rationale of 
the "fireman's rule" does not apply the assumption of 
risk doctrine to public officers because of any spirit of 
venturesomeness in the face of known danger. Rather, it 
is based upon the officer's relationship with the public, 
from which arises his obligation to accept the usual 
risks inherent in his duties, whether caused by 
negligence or not. (Citations omitted). (Emphasis added). 
In the instant case, Goodwin ~eeks recovery for an injury to 
her person caused by Hare during a lawful arrest claiming that Hare 
intentionaiJy resisted arrest thus causing the injury. He~a, she 
accepted the risks inherent in her duties as a deputy sheriff. 
In Millsaps, the Commonwealth sought recovery against Millsaps 
where Millsaps engaged in a high speed chase attempting to elude 
police which terminated in an accident causing damages. In that 
case, the high speed chase was an intentional act of Millsaps; 
Millsaps entered the vehicle and a chase entailed since Millsaps 
did not want to be apprehended by the police; Millsaps could have 
easily allowed the police to question him but instead he decided to 
drive away and cause a pursuit. The police officer then created a 
"rolling roadblock" in an effort to stop Millsaps' vehicle. 
. . 




police officer preventing the stop contemplated by the "rolling 
roadblock. " The chase ended in a crash. The court reasoned in 
Millsaps that the rolling roadblock the police officer created and 
the accident th~t resulted was foreseeable and that such was 
inherent in the normal duties of a police officer. This is the 
distinction · · that must be made· in the instant case. It is 
foreseeable that a police officer during an arrest will be, quite 
often, faced with a person resisting arrest or be subject to injury 
while apprehending a person suspected of a crime whether the injury 
is caused by accident, negligence, or intent. The distinction here 
is not whether the incident is intentional or negligent, but 
whether the incident is foreseeable in the line of police work. 
As stated above, the Court in Crouch made this same foreseeability 
distinction where the fireman could not recover due to a fire that 
was created·. This r·easoning should apply in the instant as it has 
since the line of cases from Crouch. 
Police officers and fire fighters assume the risk of the their 
respective professions. Goodwin, as a deputy sheriff, assumed the 
risk of possibly being injured while apprehending and arresting 
persons suspected of crimes. The risk of injury was "inherently 
involved in ... [her) ... normal pursuit ... [her) police duties .... " 
Commonwealth v . Millsaps, 352 s.E. 2d at 315, 232 Va. at 506. 
Furthermore, this Court, most recently, in Michael L. Johnson 
v. Brian C. Rosemond, Law Number L-272-91 (Circuit Court County of 
Hanover, 1992), in a Court Order dated July 16, 1992, applied this 
same reasoning consistent with the line of cases flowing from 
4 
Crouch and denied recovery for a police officer who was injured by 
an intentional act of a suspected fleeing felon. This Court found 
that the risk encountered by the police officer (a fleeing felon 
during a high speed chase stopping in the middle of a road on a 
blind curve which caused an accident and injury to the police 
officer) was - foreseeable and concluded that the only issue to 
decide was whether the risk was forseeable and an inheret risk of 
a high speed chase. In the instant case, being injured while 
making a lawful arrest is forseeable and clearly an inhereint risk 
of a police officer who is sworn to make such arrests. 
Therefore, Hare's Motion for Summary Judgment should be 
granted. If it is not, there will be a lawsuit each time a police 
officer is injured while performing his or her duties that they are 
sworn to. Their sole remedy is compensation from the Virginia 
Worker's Compensation Commission. 
II. WHETHER HARE IS BARRED FROM REQUESTING RELIEF 
BASED UPON THE "FIREMAN t S RULE WtH:N HARE HAS 
NOT PLEAD ASSUMPTION OF RISK AS AN AFFIRMATIVE 
DEFENSE? 
In response to Goodwin's Motion in Opposition that the Summary 
Judgment motion cannot be heard by the Court since Hare did not 
plead assumption of risk as an affirmative defense, Hare's contends 
that Goodwin only plead using an intentional tort theory and 
assumption of risk only applies in negligence actions. However, if 
the Court feels that such affirmative defenses must be raised 




this Court, Hare will amend his pleadings accordingly. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing, David Keith Hare, by counsel, 
pursuant to Rule 3: 18 of The Rules of the Supreme Court of 
Virginia, respectfully requests that his Motion for Summary 
Judgment be grunted and that this _case be dismissed with prejudice. 
Respectfully submitted, 
BY: 
Frank G. Uvanni, Esquire 
Carl J. Witmeyer, II, Esquire 
Chalkley & Witmeyer 
327 South Richardson Road 
Ashland, Virginia 23005 
(804) 550-210_(> 
DAVID KEITH HARE 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this "'2-'-"day of August, 1992, a true 
and correct copy of the foregoing Memorandum of Law in support of 
Defendant's Motion for Summary Judqment, was mailed, postage pre-
paid, to: 
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C ITY OF FREDERICKSBURG 
The motion for summary judgment filed by the defendant is granted 
for the reasons set forth in the defendant's memoranda of law. Mr. Witmeyer 




V I R G I N I /\.: 
IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE COUNTY OF HANOVER 
STEWART A. GOODWIN, Plaintiff, 
v. CASE NO. CL91-177 
DAVID REITH HARE, Defendant. 
· ORDER 
On this jJ_ day of ()J-t,~ 1 /qq~ , came the parties, 
by counsel, upon the Motion for Summary Judgment of David Keith 
Hare and upon the pleadings, and was argued by counsel. 
Upon the Memorandum filed herein, and the Court finding and 
determining it proper to do so, it is hereby ORDERED that the 
Motion for Summary Judgment is hereby granted, for the reasons 
stated in the Court's Letter Opinion, dated September 10, 1992, 
and upon the Memorandum filed by the defendant and made of 
record. 
It is hereby further ORDERED that this case is hereby 
dismissed on the ground that the plaintiff's claim is barred by 
the "fireman's rule . " 
The objectio~s and exceptions of the plaintiff, Stewart A. 
Goodwin, by counsel, on the grounds set forth in her Memorandum; 
, for the reason that the defendant did not allege the defense of 
the "fireman's rule" in his grounds of defense; and for the 
reason that the "fireman's rule" has no applicability in this 
case, are preserved. 
This matter is hereby dismissed with prejudice and stricken 





I ask for this: 
(_ l'-L· , l .-· 
1 
p.d. .·  (c· fu-
· _c_a_r_l~J-.--,w~i~t-~~~y-e-r-,~I-I~~~~ 
Chalkley & "Witmeyer 
P. o. Box 6006 
Ashland, VA 23005 
Seen and Objected to: 
~ tl,_. JdL .. cil;, I ~ 'p. q. 
~Koliadko, Jr. (VS~JOOJJ) 
Edward D. Barnes & Associates, P.C. 
P. o. Box 104 
10101 Iron - Bridge Road 
Chesterfield, VA 23832-0104 
(804) 748-5897 
(804) 751-0918 (te1ecopier) 
A COPYTESTE 
R ichar<l L. Shelton, Clerk 
. ny cs .. ~~ cS!-~ 
DEP TY CLERK 
" 
V I R G I N I A: 
IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE COUNTY OF HANOVER 
STEWART A. GOODWIN, Plaintiff, 
v. CASE NO. CL91-177 
DAVID KEITH HARE, Defendant. 
NOTICE· op APPEAL 
Comes now the plaintiff, Stewart A. Goodwin, by counsel, and 
gives her Notice of Appeal to the Supreme Court of Virginia from 
the Final Order of this Court entered on October 13, 1992, by the 
Honorable Richard H. c. Taylor, Judge of the Circuit Court of the 
County of Hanover. 
STEWART A. GOODWIN 
Edward D. Barnes (VSB #12288) 
Daniel M. Koliadko, Jr. (VSB #30033) 
Edward D. Barnes & Associates, P.C. 
P. o. Box 104 
10101 Iron Bridge Road 
Chesterfield, VA 23832-0104 
(804) 748-5897 
(804) 751-0918 (telecopier) 
CERTIFICATE 
I do hereby certify that on this iz_ day of October, 1992, I 
mailed a true copy of the foregoing Notice of Appeal to Carl J. 
Witmeyer, II, Esquire, Chalkley & Witmeyer, P. O. Box 6006, 





.kLk~~~ ¥Z~hWv.kid .at .lk .~~ ~ ~~./k 
4~~~'-Jm/ Monday //U'/ 12th ~lay~ April, 1993. 
Stewart A. Goodwin, Appellant, 
against . · Record No. 9219~9 
Circuit Court No. CL91-177 
David Keith Hare, Appellee. 
From the Circuit Court of Hanover County 
Upon the petition of Stewart A. Goodwin an appeal is 
awarded him from a judgment rendered by the Circuit Court of Hanover 
County on the 13th day of October, 1992 in a certain motion for 
judgment then therein depending, wherein the said petitioner was 
plaintiff and David Keith Hare was defendant; upon the petitioner, 
or some one for him, filing an appeal bond with sufficient security 
or an irrevocable letter of credit in the clerk's 'office of the said 
court below in the penalty of $500 , within 15 days from the date of 






CERTIFICATE OF APPEAL 
Pursuant to Rule 5:23·, I, David B. Beach, Clerk of the 
Supreme Court of Virginia, do hereby certify that on April 12, 1993 
an appeal was awarded as described in the order to which this 
certificate is appended. A copy of this certificate and a copy of 
the order to which it is appended were this day mailed to the lower 
court indicated in the order and to all counsel of record. 
Given under my hand this 13th day of April, 1993. 
J_:,11J.M. 
Clerk 
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ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR 
I. The Trial Court erred in granting Summary Judgment for the 
defendant, and in applying the "fireman's rule" in this case, since 
the "fireman's rule" does not apply to intentional torts. 
II. The Trial Court erred in granting Summary Judgment for the 
defendant , based on the "fireman's rule", since the defendant had 
not pleaded assumption of the risk as an affirmative defense. 
30 

II. RESPONSE TO ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR 
1. THE TRIAL COURT WAS CORRECT IN GRANTING SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT FOR THE DEFENDANT SINCE VIRGINIA ADHERES TO THE 
"FIREMAN'S RULE" WHICH HOLDS THAT A POLICE OFFICER 
CANNOT RECOVER rROM A NEGLIGENT OR INTENTIONAL PARTY FOR 
INJURIES SUSTAINED WHERE THE ACTS OF THE PARTY OR 
OCCURRENCES THAT CAUSED THE INJURY ARE THOSE WHICH ARE 
FORESEEABLE IN THE LINE OF THE POLICE OFFICER'S DUTIES. 
2 . THE TRIAL COURT WAS CORRECT IN GRANTING SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT FOR THE · DEFENDANT BASED UPON THE "FIREMAN'S 
RULE REGARDLESS OF· WHETHER THE DEFENDANT PLEAD 
ASSUMPTION OF THE RISK AS AN AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE SINCE 
THE "FIREMAN'S RULE" AS A MATTER OF LAW BARS POLICE 
OFFICERS FROM SUCH INDEPENDENT ACTIONS AND FURTHER, THE 
DEFENDANT REQUESTED IN HIS MOTION FOR SUMMARY FOR LEAVE 
TO AMEND THE PLEADINGS TO INCLUDE SUCH AN AFFIRMATIVE 
DEFENSE, IF NECESSARY, AND THE TRIAL COURT, IN ITS 
DISCRETION, DID NOT SEE THE NECESSITY TO DO SO AND 
GRANTED SUMMARY JUDGMENT ACCORDINGLY. 
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